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Abstract My lecture is about the study of transforming peasantries, in two senses:
both as the subjects, as well as the agents of societal transformation. The differ-
ential development performance of rural India and China is explained through
stylised micro-comparisons drawn from longitudinal village, and synthetic field
studies conducted by the author in both countries since the 1970s, highlighting the
salience of contrasting rural institutional factors, using a string of binary con-
trasting features displayed by the Indian village vis-a-vis the collectives of rural
China. The micro-cosmic comparison poses a puzzling paradox: Chinese rural
development performance easily outstripped Indian achievements in the first three
decades of its collectivist path, from 1949–1978, despite the upheavals associated
with the Great Leap Forward and the large-scale famines of the time. But, if the
initial conditions of the two countries were remarkably equivalent, and if the
external factors, state macro and inter-sectoral policies were no more, and in some
respects, considerably less favourable in China than in India, how can one explain
the superior Chinese performance in the countryside virtually across the board for
this early high-collectvism period that laid the foundations for the subsequent high-
growth trajectory at the national level? Why did rural China pull ahead, why did
India lag behind? The micro-cosmic comparisons of rural institutions are used to
resolve this paradox. The answer lies in the crucial differentiated role of the
institutional dimension in the two countries. Chinese advantage originates not in the
market reforms era, but in the socialist period when the countryside was organised
in rural collectives. In India, rural institutions were generally obstructive, sticky,
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and posed a constraint to policies of rapid transformation; in China, the institu-
tional profile, far from setting a constraint, was itself converted into a policy
instrumental variable, where institutional features were designed and periodically
redesigned primarily using the criteria of their functional appropriateness for
generating rural accumulation and growth.
Keywords India-China comparison  Rural institutions  Village studies  Rural
collectives  Technological change  Comparative development performance
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Radha Kamal Mukerjee, 1889–1968
‘‘I was trained’’, Radha Kamal Mukerjee says, ‘‘to think in large terms. Right from the
start, I had accepted the synthesis of the social sciences, and it has followed me ever
since’’ (cited in Hegde 2011, p. 50). A visionary of panoramic perspectives, a
polymath of prodigious productivity, the Indian founder of the subject of social
ecology, Radha Kamal Mukerjee was not only a promulgator of paradigms, but also a
builder of institutions. He walked his talk. He authored over 50 books alongside his
myriad other research, teaching, professional and institutional contributions. One
accomplished reviewer of his The Dynamics of Morals, published in 1950, declares,
‘‘In an age of specialization, Radha Kamal Mukerjee was a man who knew
everything’’ (Celarent 2013b, p. 1736). He would rise daily at 3 am to practise yoga
and meditation, and would then proceed to the day’s writing and dictation: ‘‘write ten
pages a day and you will have fulfilment’’, he told a student, and we can fairly assume
that he must have practised as he preached. When ever did he find time to read and
reflect, let alone for rest and repose? ‘‘Perhaps my generation is over by now’’, he said
in 1958, aged 69; and perhaps he was right, they don’t make them like that anymore.
Developing from his initial formal training in economics, Mukerjee evolved into
an extraordinary social scientist. Ramkrishna Mukherjee (1989), writing a memorial
on the occasion of the birth centenary of Radha Kamal Mukerjee, distils the essence
of his intellectual approach into three elements. First, though trained formally in the
subject, he ‘‘conceived economics as a specialization, and not as a discipline, in the
realm of social science’’; second, he elevated the ‘‘appraisal of social reality from a
unidisciplinary or interdisciplinary outlook … to a transdiscplinary perspective
within the unitary discipline of social science’’; and third, he ‘‘introduced the
‘institutional approach’… [within] the rubric of social science’’.
Ramkrishna Mukherjee observes that such a willing, indeed wilful, transgression
of established disciplinary boundaries was unacceptable to its various gatekeepers,
or to the ‘‘contemporary mandarins’’ of the individual disciplines of social science,
whether in economics or sociology, and ‘‘therefore, Mukerjee became a bratya, a
marginal man in the realm of social science’’, an academic outcaste. The other side
of the coin of exclusion can be liberty; and rejection had its silver lining in the form
of freedom to practise social science as he thought fit. He defied the artificial
boundaries of conventional disciplines; he was undisciplined, unbounded, but not
ungrammared, as should be evident for instance from his foundational work on
human ecology and the environment, though his subject, of which he is now justly
regarded as a pioneer, was largely ignored by academicians and policymakers of the
time and that sadly continues to this day. In this regard, his remarkable prescience
made him a man not whose time was over, but a thinker well ahead of his time.
In a cumulative body of work as copious, wide-ranging and freethinking as his,1 it
would be impossible for anyone, whether then or now, not to find specific areas of
difference in perspective or opinion, or discomfort with aspects of style and composition
1 For a sampling of the tip of the iceberg of his work, see Mukerjee (1916, 1934, 1938, 1945, 1950).
Transforming peasantries in India and China 87
ISLE 123
– cited thus, for instance, could be: for some, his proclivity towards Hinduism; his
treatment of the dimensions of gender and population in his oeuvre; or his construction
and espousal, in resonance with Tagore and Gandhi, of an indigenous, intrinsically
‘‘Indian’’ development path or model – the latter drawing a significant early critique in
Indian versus Western Industrialism, the title of a work by his contemporary Brij Narain
in 1919 (discussed and reproduced in Krishnamurty 2009).
1.2 Structure of the Lecture
In this lecture in his honour, I am guided by two signposts that he laid down: the first,
to transcend specialisations and disciplines and to view social realities within a more
holistic transdisciplinary framework; the second, to integrate institutional dimensions
into the frame of social enquiry. Even a holistic transdisciplinary approach can still
only be a means, a method for achieving a superior understanding of social reality. To
what end is such an approach employed? What are the questions?
My lecture is about the study of transforming peasantries. I use the term in two
senses: peasantries both as the subjects as well as the agents of societal transformation.
In what follows, I will attempt to explain the differential performance of rural India
and China through micro-comparisons drawn from field study and observations in both
countries. I highlight the salience of contrasting rural institutional factors in explaining
the differential outcomes. I start by posting and elaborating on a paradox which defines
the research question for this lecture. In the following sections, I use a set of
longitudinal village studies to investigate the interplay of technological change and
institutional profiles in the case of rural India, using the studied village as a prism for
an exploration of these linkages. Thereafter, I provide a highly stylised comparison
between the rural Indian and the collectivist rural Chinese institutional frameworks and
development processes using a string of binary, microcosmic contrasting features. I use
these comparisons to attempt to resolve the paradox posed.
1.3 China and India: Posing a Paradox
China has had two revolutions, two transitions: the first towards socialism, and the
second, away from it towards capitalism. It has been my contention that the
achievements of the former laid the foundation for the performance of the latter.
China now leads India on virtually all counts of development; but it was already
significantly ahead by 1978, the starting point of the second transition. That
advantage was gained not in the market reforms era, but in the socialist period when
the Chinese countryside was institutionally reorganised into rural collectives.
The microcosmic comparison between the Indian and the Chinese village2 was
propelled by a puzzling paradox. On the one side, Chinese rural development
2 One people’s commune in rural China would comprise approximated 10 production brigades; in turn,
each brigade contained about 10 production teams, the most basic unit of account. The teams were the
collective owners of their land; the brigades contained a variety of non-farm activities and enterprises
along with some specialised agricultural functions, and the commune level had small-scale rural industrial
enterprises generally of a larger scale than those found at the brigade level. The production brigade, with
its intermediate and micro-level enterprises, and the production teams with their agriculture, thus form a
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performance easily outstripped Indian achievements in the first three decades of its
collectivist path, say from 1949–1978, despite the upheavals associated with the
Great Leap Forward and the large-scale famines of the time. This is supported by a
wide variety of evidence: output and input levels, infrastructural development and
mechanisation, the use of electrical power, and significantly, in terms of human
development indicators, for instance the overall death rate which plummeted over
the period in sharp contrast to Indian trends. Both India and China had similar crude
death rates in 1960: 23.52 in India and a less favourable 25.43 in China; in 1977, the
Indian rate had dropped to 14.1 while China’s had plummeted to 6.25 in 1978, a
level that has been roughly maintained to the present.
On the other side, it is arguable that the external conditions of the rural sector
were no more, and in some respects clearly less favourable in China than in India.
For instance, overall state public investment in agriculture had approximately the
same relative importance in the budget; and in both countries, in its design, plan
strategies accorded some protection to the small- scale, mostly rural manufacturing
and handicrafts sectors against competition from the rising urban large-scale
manufacturing sector.
If anything, some factors in China weighed against the rural sector; in India, there
were no taxes on agricultural/rural incomes though this was not the case in rural
China, and the inter-sectoral terms of trade were biased against agriculture in China,
in sharp contrast to the Indian case for this period when richer agriculturists
received, as they continue to do, very significant subsidies on irrigation water,
fertilisers and electrical power.
This introduces the paradox: if the initial conditions of the two countries were
quite remarkably similar, and if the external conditions of the rural sector were
either similar or more favourable for the rural sector in India than in China, how can
one explain the superior Chinese performance in the countryside, virtually across
the board for this significant early period that laid the foundations for the subsequent
high-growth trajectory at the national level? Why did rural China pull ahead, why
did India lag behind?
Elsewhere (Saith 2008a; 2010), I have analysed this paradox at an aggregated
national level and come to the conclusion that the answer lies in the crucial
differentiated role of the institutional dimensions in the two countries. In India, rural
institutions were generally obstructive, sticky, and posed a constraint to policies of
rapid transformation; in China, the institutional profile, far from setting a constraint,
was itself converted into a policy instrumental variable, where institutional features
were designed and redesigned primarily using the criteria of their functional
appropriateness for generating rural accumulation and growth. In this lecture, I
return to this paradox, but this time at the micro-level, looking especially into the
internal institutional features of an Indian village.
Footnote 2 continued
unit that could be compared sensibly with an Indian village such as Parhil also known as Kishan Garhi
that features in this paper. In size, Parhil with a population of about a thousand in 1970 was approximately
the size of a rural Chinese production brigade.
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On the Indian side, I rely on the longitudinal analysis of a single village, Parhil,
in which I have been involved in joint research with Ajay Tankha, since 1970.
I use our surveys carried out in 1970 and then in 1987 covering a period
appropriate for this enquiry.3 Significantly, this village, under the name Kishan
Garhi,4 was earlier studied by the Chicago anthropologist, McKim Marriott, and his
writings, reflecting his research during his first study in 1950–52, and second visit in
1968, serve both to extend the period under observation, and provide another
perspective to the review.
Unlike this Indian story told through the case of a village studied separately by
two researchers over time, the Chinese tale is a synthetic construction incorporating
my own research in very many locations in rural China during about a dozen short
study visits, usually lasting 2–4 weeks, since 1979. None of the units visited were
revisited though in very many units, data were obtained on the recent evolution of
the unit. Findings from most of this research have been published. What follows is
based on an understanding derived from this cumulative body of work. It provides a
general account of processes of rural transformation during the era of high
collectivism, 1962–78, most closely associated with Maoist strategies of socialist
development.
Perhaps inevitably, in view of its idiosyncratic source materials, the lecture
employs diverse approaches and methods. It addresses the research question in a
comparative framework. Potentially, comparisons offer the possibility of triangu-
lation, and often by seeing others you can recognise your own self better. It
combines book and field, though advocates of the field might have underestimated
the extent to which the book forms the precious personal baggage, the security
blanket that every researcher carries to the field. It relies both on macro with the
micro perspectives in pursuing its questions. It occasionally touches on historical
dimensions. It favours a more holistic social science perspective, and in keeping
with Mukerjee’s prescription, accords no special status to economics; and if all this
was not enough, it gives primacy to the institutional dimension in understanding
difference and dynamics. Too often, institutions are taken as a latent given, an
invisible and passive part of the furniture of the arena in which the forces of supply
and demand are assumed to battle it out. One needs to go beyond this and activate
this dimension as a dynamic element in analysis and explanations. This list is too
long, and so I fear it guarantees failure.
2 ENTERING THE VILLAGE
With due apologies, I start with some autobiographical bits and pieces with the
justification that these have some bearing on what follows.
3 Findings are reported in Saith and Tankha (1972a, 1972b, 1992, 1993, 1997).
4 For an extensive, though not exhaustive coverage of Marriott’s work on this village, see: Marriott
(1952a, 1952b, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c, 1968, 1972, 1973, 1975, 2008).
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2.1 Economics and Sociology, Never the Twain Shall Meet?
At the time of the founding of Lucknow University in 1921, Radha Kamal Mukerjee
established a combined Department of Economics and Sociology, and served it as
professor and head till 1955; the department also incorporated the disciplines of
anthropology, social work, social psychology and population science. A young
student walking through the portal of the department could not but have had a
sustained exposure to multidisciplinarity, not least on account of the intellectual
breadth and dynamism of the major figures associated with what came to be called
the Lucknow School.5
2.2 The Serendipitous Encounter With Parhil
The Saith and Tankha studies have an idiosyncratic origin. In 1969–70, K.N. Raj,
then director of the Delhi School of Economics, was unconvinced by some gung-ho
interpretations of the Green Revolution that were being aired, including those by
McKim Marriott after his revisit of 1968 to Kishan Garhi. He thought it would be a
very good learning exercise for us to go to the village directly for an independent
view. ‘‘Go and find out first about rural India!’’ I recall him saying; the start of the
doctoral project could wait a bit, and it would only benefit from this exposure, he
felt. We had not reckoned on the protocol of gatekeeping, and were sharply
admonished by a senior sociologist for having ‘‘entered Kim’s village without his
explicit permission’’. The identity of the village was in the open; we were not aware
of such protocol; we were commissioned by none other than one of India’s most
respected economists; so off we went to Parhil, the real name of the village.
2.3 Like an Indian in Bharat
The entry into the village was not easy or comfortable, and not because the villagers
were unwelcoming. It had more to do with one’s own identity and the baggage one
5 Unfortunately, I had no such luck when entering the Faculty of Economics and Sociology at the Delhi
School of Economics. Each discipline, led by its own heavyweight academic thekedar, was entrenched in
its own department and building, running their own independent and non-intersecting curricula and
seminars, generally casting aspersions and an evil gaze on each other, while claiming intellectual
superiority. It was always one binary battle or the other: economics versus sociology; caste versus class;
purpose versus meaning; observation versus measurement; Raj versus Srinivas, or Srinivas versus
Srinivasan; Marxists versus the rest. Younger staff were regimented foot soldiers; students, just cannon
fodder. The silent grammar of commensality forbade unwarranted contact; only a select few exercised the
freedom to cross the border, perhaps to maintain minimal functional communication between the warring
tribes. Late in the day, an attempt was made to set up Conversations between Economists and
Anthropologists, but predictably it turned out to be the proverbial dialogue of the deaf (Bardhan and
Srinivasan 1989). It was all sometimes a pantomime, sometimes a cacophony, but always a farce.
Information took the addictive forms of gossip and rumour. But, all this notwithstanding, economics and
sociology did meet regularly, in the coffee house: most students in Sociology were female, most in
Economics, male – which perhaps partly explains the gendering of the two disciplines – and they met up
in the neutral territory of the DSE coffee house strategically located, equidistant between the two
buildings. For recollections of some other contemporaries, see Kumar and Mookherjee (1995).
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was carrying, and these realisations wrapped themselves very quickly as we stepped
into village space.
I was not born in a village; neither was either of my parents, nor any of my
grandparents, or even great grandparents on either side. I had seen a lot of rural
India, but through the windows of rail compartments, though I had spent a couple of
months in deep rural Palamau during the Bihar Famine of 1966–67 (Roy, Saith and
Singh 1967). But that did not prepare me for living in the village. So, almost the first
realisation that hit home was that I was like an alien in my own country; I was an
‘‘Indian’’ in ‘‘Bharat’’. This was revelatory, salutary and chastening. There was a
chasmic distance between the village and my own background. There was a sense of
discomfort, at least initially, over the loss of personal ‘‘space’’ and ‘‘privacy’’. There
were no secrets here, not even in the fields one used for daily ablutions and
excretions. But underlying, and partially explaining it, is the chasm between
‘‘modern’’ urban and ‘‘traditional’’ rural lives.
All said and done, fieldwork, like mountain climbing, is less pleasurable in real
time than in hindsight, when reminiscing about it from a comfortable separation in
space and time. Anybody who claims they actually enjoyed their fieldwork is
probably a dissembler and more than a little disingenuous.6
But there were also unforgettable moments of beauty: lying on a charpai in the
open, the night sky seemed immediately reachable, touchable; its density of
blackness, the piercing brightness of stars; the sounds and calls that travelled far and
clear; peacocks, bird life; borewell baths; the strange experience of silence,
noiselessness, such that it elongated the sense of time. Away from the extreme
ambient light and sound levels of the city, there was a startling realisation of the
pleasure of original senses. I digress!
2.4 From Book to Field
Srinivas (1966b, p. 158) is obviously right to emphasise the value of field research,
‘‘the study of a village or a small town or a caste provides a strategic point of
entry for the study of Indian society and culture as a whole. It forces the young
scholar to keep his mind steadfastly on the existential reality as contrasted
with the book-view of society’’.
But how far is it really possible to escape the prior baggage of book-views that
the researcher carries into the field arena? No clean slates are possible. A Srinivas
student would be pre-primed to look at caste, a Rudra student would be pre-prepared
to look for class.
Had I just changed one pair of spectacles for another - a Marxian framework in
place of a conventional economics template? Class instead of caste? And how
would one define ‘‘class’’ with all its ramifications?7 Indeed, when re-reading our
6 ‘‘I enjoyed my fieldwork much more in retrospect than when doing it. I was not a good fieldworker,
nothing more than a B- or a B’’ (Beteille 1986, 0:13:08–0:16:23).
7 See for instance, Chayanov (1967); Mukherjee (1957), 1958; Thorner and Thorner (1962), Thorner
(1962a, 1962b); Patnaik (1987); Bhattacharya (2001).
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original studies of 1972, this effect is palpable, though it is held at bay by the very
serious and detailed empirics on which any statements were made, with the content
still protected from the style. Andre Beteille speaks wisely about the value of
retaining the ‘‘messiness’’ of real situations, rather than ironing these out by the
application of preconceived definitions and theories and making all reality conform
to it. Even when using some preset frameworks, we retained all the messiness,
because it was the source of so much creative reflection.
It is not feasible or necessary to discuss the myriad other issues of engaging in
serious fieldwork, from questions of one’s identity and prior intellectual orientation
amongst other factors.8 Srinivas (1966b, pp. 156–157) says ‘‘in the process of
putting himself in the shoes of the members of another community, the sociologist
becomes to some extent detached from his own’’. He quotes Whyte approvingly,
‘‘I began as a non-participating observer. As I became accepted into the
community, I found myself becoming almost a non-observing participant’’.
Srinivas says: ‘‘the transition from a non-participating observer to a
participating observer cannot happen without the sociologist’s exercising all
his powers of empathy’’.
This is of course more easily said than done, since how the researcher is
perceived or accepted depends overwhelmingly on the ‘‘community’’ that he is
studying.9 And then there are issues about studying one’s own culture and society or
some other (Srinivas 1996).
2.5 Towards Multidisciplinarity: Changing Spectacles
Some, one would imagine like Radha Kamal Mukerjee, are born multidisciplinary;
some achieve multidisciplinarity; and others have it thrust upon them. Like him, I
started my journey as an economist, but was ambushed by the village which
veritably demanded multidisciplinarity of me. The dismantling of mono-disci-
plinarity, or lessons in multidisciplinarity, started virtually on the first day and came
thick and fast. Data gathering has a relational dimension, linking the perceptions
and agendas of the researcher and the researched. Simple questions beget complex
answers – the size of the village population, or a person’s age or occupation, or the
amount of fertiliser used, or the number of goats owned, all have contingent answers
and complexities that demand a deeper understanding of the phenomenon before
noting down the first statistic, and that too should be pencilled, not inked. How
delegation of data collection to the venerable ‘‘field investigator’’ is the death of
learning for the researcher, and sometimes of accuracy for the data. How qualitative
notes can be recorded diligently in the space dutifully reserved for them, but then
get inexorably orphaned and deserted at the stage of data transcription into
spreadsheets. As you assemble data by plot, crop, by-product, input and operation,
8 For some perspectives on this range of issues, see Beteille and Madan (eds.) (1975), Beteille
(1986, 2002), Patel (2011), Srinivas (1960, 1966a, 1966b, 1996).
9 See here, for instance, the insightful commentary by Breman (2010) in the volume in honour of Andre
Beteille (Karlekar and Mukherjee 2010).
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the realisation dawns that good data demands a multiple of the time and resources
allocated for the survey,10 simply to get a reliable figure for earnings or
productivity. The discovery that there is nothing like ‘‘exogenous’’, that lifecycle,
episodic, or ‘‘chance’’ events play a crucial and determining role in the lives of
families; not to mention the significance of seasonality and time with all the issues it
drags in. Then, the awareness of the relatedness of things: the need to research
landlords and tenants as pairs; the need to analyse households within their kinship
and lineage frameworks or belonging and exchange; the complexity of mapping
commensalities; exploring the structure and dynamics of the jajmani system; and the
list is endless, even without addressing larger issues of framing and
conceptualisation.
Perhaps it was just as well that one did not receive any prior formal instruction on
how to study a village or do field work for one might then never have started. As it
happened, one just plunged in with the curiosity and commitment of youth and
learnt the doing of it through actually doing it.
3 THE TRADITIONAL VILLAGE TRANSFORMED?
This section deals sequentially with the initial study of the Indian village, laying the
baseline, conducted by Marriott in 1950–52, followed by his short revisit in 1968
when he made his discovery of positive transformation, which leads to Saith and
Tankha’s first study of 1970 where some of this optimism was deflated, and then to
their 1987 restudy which provides details of changes over the Green Revolution
period.
3.1 An Indian Village in Its Traditional State: Marriott, 1950–52
McKim Marriott did his anthropology at Chicago in an active research-oriented
department; its anthropology seminar was well established in the 1950s. He worked
in Kishan Garhi during 1950–52, and then wrote a seminal paper on the
‘‘overdeveloped village’’ in the first issue of the new Chicago journal Economic
Development and Cultural Change in 1955, which should have landed with a thump
on the desk of Theodore Schultz who then was the head of the economics
department, and also interested in issues of agricultural technology and develop-
ment; it could hardly have gone unnoticed. Also in the same department during the
decade of the 1960s was Clifford Geertz, who in 1963, published his study on
Agricultural Involution in Indonesia, where there was embedded some kind of a
steady state model of technology–institutions interaction at the level of the village.
These were variational analyses of rural dynamics. Significantly, Schultz’s own
classic Transforming Traditional Agriculture was published in 1964, and in it he has
characterisations of technology in peasant agriculture that resonate powerfully with
the work of Marriott, though perhaps less explicitly so with Geertz (1963). It seems
10 One is reminded of Walter Neale’s classic sobering review of the problems of village survey data
(Neale 1958). See also Mann (1917).
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that, unlike the Delhi School of Economics, economists and anthropologists were
communicating and having conversations and learning from each other. Effectively,
Marriott’s graduate study from Kishan Garhi seems to have provided the template
for Schultz’s ‘‘poor but efficient peasants’’ thesis that won him the Nobel Award
later.11
3.1.1 Marriott’s ‘‘overdeveloped’’ village in static equilibrium
Marriott’s construction of a ‘‘static equilibrium’’ has the structure of a closed model
of the relationship between technology and institutions.
‘‘Overdevelopment [is] the pressing of techniques up to and beyond the point
of an optimum relation between man and environment. In an overdeveloped
area, too many techniques are too exhaustively applied by too many people to
too little land […] much development has occurred in the past, often too much
development. Technologies have reached what seems to be a static equilib-
rium. A technique has little room in which to spread’’.
‘‘It is usual to think of technology as something that can be added to a rural
area to develop it.’’
‘‘The problems of technological change in an overdeveloped area are not the
same as our familiar additive problems. Rarely does technological change
merely add new things; more often, it alters the pattern and structure of
people’s lives. It does not just add, but creates a new structure or pattern, and
often destroys an old structure or pattern. In this fact lie some of the most
serious practical problems of technical change.’’
‘‘Overdevelopment means that techniques have come to be tightly intercon-
nected with each other: introduction of another new technique may disrupt or
require readjustment of many old techniques.’’
‘‘Technology in an old, overdeveloped area is likely to have become
interconnected with many patterns of personal and social behaviour –
groupings, ideas, beliefs. Introduction of a new technique may be followed by
acceptance or rejection according to criteria which are not directly technical at
all, but social and cultural’’ (Marriott 1952a, p. 261).
Marriott’s analysis of static equilibrium implies an inherent resistance to any
change, since there could be considerable transactional cost in the form of collateral
adjustments and adaptations required in various arenas, including in tastes and
preferences, production technologies, economic and commercial relationships,
exchanges between farmers and government officials, between peasants and
animals, in attitudes towards borrowing, debt and risk-taking. This would impart
any local static equilibrium with a kink, a discontinuity. In turn this would suggest
the existence of the usual logistic curve pattern of adoption ranging from early to
11 Runge (2006, p. 10), in his detailed intellectual history of (mostly American) agricultural economics,
concludes: ‘‘Indeed, T.W. Schultz’s famous Transforming Traditional Agriculture (1964) relied mainly
on stylised representations of ‘‘rational but poor’’ farmers and descriptive analysis from anthropologists.’’
Reading the text and texture of Schultz’s descriptions of the poor-but-efficient peasant, this seems entirely
plausible.
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late adopters, depending on how the circumstances and resource profiles of
individual farmers dovetailed with the preconditions and side-effects of the adoption
of any new practice. The kink would also imply that conditions favourable to
technological change would need to build up to a level where these could spill over
the barrier leading to the wider adoption of new methods.
For Marriott, this was the situation in Kishan Garhi in 1950–52, the baseline.
3.1.2 Institutional reproduction – social competition and contestation
On the institutional side, Marriott’s interest was focussed primarily on ritual aspects
of the caste system – the complex matrices of social commensality, the restrictions
placed by caste on social behaviour and on the pattern of economic transactions; on
caste contestation and competition, and conflict mostly over rank, prestige and
privilege, status and authority, with secondary interest in the distribution of
resources per se. But through all this, he does offer a perspective on how such a
fractious and segmented social framework interfaced with the possibilities of
collective action for the village as a whole. The diagnosis is far from optimistic, and
seems to suggest a cantankerous, turgid social equilibrium that is dysfunctional to
the modernisation project. There is implicit that this a notion of another ‘‘static
equilibrium’’, this time applying to social arrangements, that is analogous to the
‘‘static equilibrium’’ that he explicitly sketches with regard to agricultural
technology.
Marriott does comment on internal conflict in Parhil, even though that is far from
his central focus. Writing on the basis of his 1950–52 fieldwork, he notes ‘‘the
weakness of formal local government’’, alongside the existence of ‘‘intense factional
struggle’’. ‘‘In a sample of thirty-six groups of persons engaged in litigation, half the
groups cut across caste lines and joined diverse persons together by allying them in
common hostilities.’’ The village, he suggests, ‘‘is the local stage on which relative
dominance and relative prestige must be fought out’’ Marriott (1955c, p. 178). A
subsequent commentary (Marriott 1955a) is much more extensive and unequivocal.
Competition and low intensity conflict seemed to permeate all aspects of village
social, cultural and institutional life, marking economic, caste, kinship, convivial
and political groupings. Marriott (1955a, p. 120) makes the following grim overall
assessment of the state of play, and of its wider implications:
‘‘Were the national economy moving smoothly toward the goal of improved
sustenance and a better rural life, then the problem of concerted action in
villages like Kishan Garhi might not be thought acute. But some amount of
concerted action is now required by intense and inequitable competition for
static productive resources and static social goods. Most programmes for
technical or economic development or rural India require that there be a
modicum of local co-operation that disregards primary group affiliations.
Officials at all levels recognize the fragmentation of village social structure as
a chief obstacle in the way of any programme. The low state of co-operation
that presently prevails among the kin groups of Kishan Garhi and the
structural features that determine it, suggest that greater concerted action will
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be achieved in the future only by a more severe unsettling of basic structures
that has occurred in any age of the past.’’
Clearly, some sort of foundational upheaval is thought to be a precondition for
meaningful collective action for wider rural development.
Kishan Garhi seems clearly to be mired in conflict, not of a form that
fundamentally challenges the foundations of social life in the village, but of a
continual low intensity form of contestations and bickering, of jockeying and
jousting, continual fractious social jostling over rank, prestige and privilege.12
Put together, the technological and social equilibria generate an unchanging
world of social reproduction. Kishan Garhi is almost akin to a museum piece.
3.2 Marriott Returns – A Generation of Change, 1950–68
Preparing for his return, he had been influenced by the general air of pessimism and
criticisms aired by academics, by government officials, by US embassy staff, Ford
Foundation13 professionals and journalists.
‘‘I therefore had negative expectations when preparing to return to Kishan
Garhi village in 1968. Assuming a static technology and growing population, I
thought that I would find increasing hunger, dissatisfaction, and conflict in the
village. With quickened emigration, there might well be disorganization of
families, and a dissolution of the proud peasantry into a rural or urban
proletariat. With the devaluing of rural life presumed to accompany these
processes, I expected that the village culture of 1951 would be in decline, if
not in total disrespect’’ (Marriott 1972, p. 7).
As supportive evidence, Marriott does not offer conventional statistical
comparisons of the usual range of variables, i.e., cropping patterns, production,
yield, NPK use, sales, prices and incomes. Instead of relying on numbers, he
‘‘chooses instead to proceed empirically’’ using the medium of photography. On the
basis of an archive of 5,800 photographs, 4,300 of which were taken in the 20-week
revisit, he provides, with his annotations, a ‘‘selection of views arranged as a series
of paired comparisons in many aspects of life spanning a generation in the history of
the village of Kishan Garhi’’ (Marriott 1972, p. 7). The collection is obviously
selective, and impressively fastidious as an example of archival logging.
‘‘The present selection of visual documents from the corpus of 5,800 frames
was determined by the single purpose of showing evidence of continuity and
change in the technology, social organisation, and culture of the village
between the anthropologist’s two visits’’ (Marriott 1972, p. 2).
So what kind of changes does he observe? Marriott’s account is strikingly upbeat.
He declares the new realities he sees belie the pessimism with which he had
returned to the village.
12 There is an extensive discussion of the baseline situation of 1950–52 in Marriott (1955a, p. 112–121).
13 See also Ford Foundation (1979).
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3.2.1 The green revolution package: dynamising agriculture and tradition
Through his paired photographs and accompanying annotations, Marriott (1972)
records various details of the entry of new agricultural technologies into the village:
there is a tractor, many more tubewells, some threshers, improved ploughs, more
and better irrigation and fertilisers, new skills to service machines, and so on. The
study sponsor’s preface asserts: ‘‘the phenomenon of social and technological
change in rural society in the Third World, graphically demonstrated by Professor
Marriott, undercuts in vivid and direct fashion the myth that Third World societies
are stagnant and unchanging’’ (Marriott 1972, 111-iv).
‘‘Looking at village life in these ways reveals a generation of change in much
more than agricultural technology. Credit, subsidies, electrical power, some
fertilisers, improved seeds, and machinery were made available through
governmental channels; peasant cultivators then themselves became the main
agents of local change. Production, employment population, wages, and
charity all rose together. Trends of migration were reversed, and local conflict
declined. Diet, clothing, housing and health improved along with agricultural
prosperity. Family life also prospered, distinguishing the same roles and
relationships, but modifying styles of behaviour, especially for women and
children. Distinctions of rank among castes were reduced. Education became a
part of rural life for many, and enriched the contents of local religion.
Classical, courtly, and new urban styles were influential in many spheres (in
dress, dance, music, architecture, and social manners), but were balanced by a
renaissance of interest in the symbolic, expressive culture (the language,
paintings, and festivals, especially) of the village itself.’’
‘‘What has happened during this generation of change in the average,
conservative, remote village of Kishan Garhi is probably not exceptional.
Visitors from districts to the East and South of Aligarh look enviously at the
new tubewells, tractors, and brick buildings. Villagers from districts to the
North in Uttar Pradesh and in Punjab speak disparagingly of the drop yields,
illiteracy, and relatively slight electrification and mechanisation that they see
in Kishan Garhi. The people of Kishan Garhi themselves say both that they
have come a long way in the past 18 years and that they expect to … during
the next generation…’’ (partially illegible transcript, Marriott 1972,
pp. 33–34).
3.2.2 Institutional evolution: a harmonious turn?
As with technology, economy and levels of living, Marriott is surprised by the
harmonious turn in village social and institutional affairs under the impact of the
new technology. The village is virtually offered as a model of harmonious
modernisation, a win-win for all – indeed, incorporating a renaissance of tradition
with cultural rejuvenation rather than the loss and destruction he had originally
anticipated.
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This overall assessment is not confirmed in Saith and Tankha’s 1970 study,
where village political institutions are seen still to be moribund, exclusionary,
controlled by the rich farmers, without any election held to the gram panchayat at all
over the entire period. Here, technological advance is not viewed as having induced,
or run in parallel with, progressive social change.
For Marriott, the modernisation model was fully on track by 1968, with the
village exhibiting clear signs of moving from static equilibrium to dynamic
harmony in both the domains of technology and institutions.
Perhaps it does indeed lie in the eye of the beholder. Is the glass half empty or
half full? Marriott seems to have seen it as nearly empty in 1952, so perhaps is
excited about seeing it half full; Saith and Tankha come in in 1970 with no past
reference point, with different imaginations, and see it (rather more than) half
empty. But beyond the immediate explanation, the difficulty lies in the often
problematic interpretation of the detailed empirical evidence cited in support of the
general conclusion of ‘‘a generation of change’’. The rush to judgement sits
uncomfortably with the meticulousness with which the photographic archive is
mined for comparative pairings of images.
Marriott’s remarkably positive soundings were disseminated with alacrity to the
wider community in the form of an article in SPAN,14 the glossy news and public
relations magazine of the United States Information Service (USIS) put out by the
American embassy, as well as a radio talk on All India Radio.15
3.3 A Differing Opinion: Saith and Tankha, 1969–70
Ajay Tankha and I conducted the first round of our village survey in Parhil gathering
data for 1969–70. This was not so far apart in time from McKim Marriott’s second
Kishan Garhi study visit of 1968. As such, one could have a reasonable expectation
that we might be viewing a village scenario that had not changed significantly from
what he had seen. The differences between what we saw, then, would arise largely
from what we chose to see, and our different ways of seeing. In making any such
comparison, whether directly or implicitly, another factor needs to be borne in
mind: we were seeing the village for the first time, without any comparative
reference point against which to calibrate what we were seeing; whereas Marriott
was revisiting the village in 1968 and therefore was re-viewing it against his
recorded and recalled realities of the village as it might have been in 1950–52. We
were considering one frame, one image; he was comparing two photographs. While
we were assessing our data and information in independent, absolute terms, Marriott
would be viewing the findings of his second round in relative terms that would
highlight aspects of change.
14 The SPAN article (Marriott n.d.2) and the transcript of the AIR programme (Marriott n.d.1), though
not any statistical or other evidence, were available to us before our entry into the village in 1970; both
commentaries date from 1968–1970 years.
15 Also pertinent to mention here is the general scepticism, even acute mistrust, of US academic
interventions in the politically turbo charged climate in India in that time frame; see, for instance, the
issue of Seminar on Academic Colonialism in December 1968.
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For a traditional village supposedly in a perpetual, if not eternal, ‘‘static
equilibrium’’, a lapse of 18 years might not count for much.
But the interim years had not been without event: the years immediately after
Independence saw continuing land reforms inside the village, and the launching of
significant development plans in the industrial sphere; and importantly, the
introduction of the Green Revolution into the countryside. The new agricultural
technologies were trialled in selected districts, and Aligarh, in which Parhil falls,
was the one selected from Uttar Pradesh. This would imply strong technological and
related stimuli potentially inducing rapid change.
So, in 1970, we did not find agricultural or technological stagnation; if anything,
it was quite the opposite.
‘‘Parhil displays all the outward manifestations of the so-called ‘green
revolution’ – tubewells, tractors, new seeds, fertiliser, etc. The fact that it is
one of the interior villages in the region does not seem to have stifled the
adoption of the new technology’’ (Saith and Tankha 1972b, p. 713).
So, Marriott’s positive observations regarding the adoption of new technologies
might have astonished him in view of his presumption of ‘‘static equilibrium’’; but
they came as no surprise to us.
The main difficulty with Marriott’s interpretation lay in his assessment that the
change generated by the Green Revolution was generally economically positive and
socially harmonious, that it had stimulated village institutions into cooperative
political action and investing in collective public projects. It paid little or no
attention to the extreme inequalities in the landowning structure, to the acute
degrees of social exclusion and powerlessness, and to other access constraints that
effectively shut the landless and near-landless poor households from the gains
accruing from the technology, or from the subsidisation of it by the government
credit institutions. Trickle down was expected to happen, supported by piecemeal
evidence without looking at the totalities, thereby conveying an impression of a
win-win scenario. Implicitly, all village households are expected to resemble the
average, or representative farmer household, as in the stylised scenario underlying
Schultz’s ‘‘peasants are poor but efficient’’ thesis in Transforming Traditional
Agriculture (1964). One difficulty with Marriott’s rendition is the lack of emphasis
on the near extreme degrees of initial inequality in the ownership of resources and
productive assets. Recognising this more consistently could have qualified the rather
hastily arrived at bottom lines at village level; and perhaps also induced a more
careful interrogation of the ‘‘trickle down’’ notion implicit in the descriptions.
In view of Marriott’s deduction that ‘‘what has happened in the village … was
not exceptional’’, one is left puzzled by the gap between his upbeat optimism and
the seemingly wide consensus of pessimism and disappointment expressed (on the
pace of agricultural progress) by various categories of external researchers and
observers as reported by Marriott himself, with regard to the success of this early
thrust phase of the Green Revolution. In the absence of hard statistics presented by
Marriott, especially on various measurables, one can resolve this disagreement
through different assumptions. First, the pessimists were right, and Marriott
overstates the degree of improvement, perhaps in the euphoria of seeing things
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much better than his original dire doomsday expectations; second, that there were
indeed significant improvements in many spheres, but there were still sufficient
shortfalls in key areas, enough to generate and justify the stance of the critics and
the pessimists; or third, that these early pronouncements and quick interpretations
from Marriott were possibly somewhat unbalanced and premature and a tinge
ideological, perhaps coloured by the agenda of the larger American project to find a
technological solution to a deepening agrarian crisis.
In view of the very limited exposure to Marriott’s ‘‘empirical’’ evidence, it is
neither appropriate nor viable to attempt a critical assessment. That said, on a range
of specific issues, these positive interpretations can be usefully set alongside some
differing, if not conflicting, statistics and interpretations generated by the more or
less contemporaneous survey by Saith and Tankha for 1969–70. Only two
illustrative examples are provided below, relating to shop keeping and to education.
3.3.1 Shops and trade
Marriott (1972, p. 18) says of 1952: ‘‘villagers had little cash or grain to trade, so
that only two small shops existed with very little to sell, other than salt, pepper,
matches, country cigarettes, local grain in season, rarely other foodstuffs’’; the
annotation for 1968 reads: ‘‘Six shops have opened in the village, each stocked with
dozens of imported items – many more spices, medicines, herbs, vegetables, etc.
Most villagers can now afford to buy these new things.’’ He clearly interprets the
increase in numbers since 1950 as a sign of rising prosperity. True as that might be,
there is more to the story than this quick conflation.
Soon after in 1970, we saw the same phenomenon in a rather different
perspective. Indeed, it is worth reproducing the discussion in extenso.
‘‘There are 12 shops in the village as against four a few years ago. For a
village of 185 households this appears to be an abnormally high figure. Some
of the increase can be explained away by the increases in the volume of trade
on account of the increase in the population of the village; and some again, by
the increasing prosperity of certain sections of the village community.
However, there seems to be a particular reason for the increase in the number
(italics in original) of shops. Our interpretation is that households which
cannot for particular reasons enter other occupations, find even the low profit
margins in shop keeping attractive enough to effect an entry into the
occupation. Further, shop keeping is peculiarly vulnerable to this tendency
because it is the least exacting of all the occupations from the point of view of
entry conditions. All you need is some unemployed female or child labour and
some working capital, which can be borrowed from the village moneylender.
Thus, a shop might be set up temporarily for a few months when the household
is unemployed, and be given up when better employment opportunities present
themselves. Explicably then, it is usual to find shop keeping to be only one of
several activities of the households involved. It must also be clear by now that
the expansion in the number of shops in a village does not necessarily reflect
prosperity – and certainly not in Parhill’’ (Saith and Tankha 1972b, p. 717).
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This contemporary description is at odds with Marriott’s reading; one is also
puzzled by the reference to stocks of ‘‘dozens of imported items’’, especially if these
were imported from sources beyond Aligarh.
3.3.2 Education
The progress of education provides another pertinent case to consider. In 1951, there
were few evidence of girls even in elementary schools, which were mostly attended
by boys from wealthier upper-caste families ‘‘who were often bored’’, and ‘‘rarely
did anyone finish high school’’; ‘‘school seemed to prepare students only to be
schoolteachers and clerks’’ – though how this would happen if nobody finished
school remains unresolved. In 1968, school participation is much more widespread,
and ‘‘youngsters now see school as leading to exciting jobs using the new
technology; these boys are wearing goggles, thinking of becoming astronauts’’;
‘‘one rich kid has an MS in chemistry and hopes to do a PhD abroad’’ (Marriott
1972, p. 23–24). Earlier, schooling created a status and aversion to working on the
family land; ‘‘in 1969, working on the land with a new technology is thought to be a
profitable way of applying one’s learning’’ (Marriott 1972, p. 10).
Our statistical evidence from 1969–70 provides some grounds for reflection. We
found that the average years of schooling was 1.95 years, for males it was 3.05, and
for girls, 0.63 years; there were three households, of a total of 185, where a member
had an educational level of more than 12 years (Saith and Tankha 1992, Table 1).
These are hardly numbers that indicate an educational revolution, regardless of
wearing goggles, wanting to be an astronaut or one person (not recorded in 1970)
wishing to do a PhD abroad. For all accounts, these numbers are suggestive of an
utterly pathetic educational profile; and so indeed it seemed to us in the village in
1970. If one were to factor in the acute inequalities prevalent in the village, the level
of educational attainment for the majority of the landless and land-poor households
would be abysmal. The average figure for girls, 0.63 school years, really says that
apart from a handful of girls who went to school for a few years, the rest were really
illiterate; so what if three girls were found by Marriott (1972, p. 23) to be in high
school in 1968. What positives can one really take from these new outliers – with an
overall profile as bad as the one prevailing all of two full school-cycles ago.
Marriott’s positive spin on education seems to be just that, and suggests that the
source of his optimism in this domain might have been due to focussing on the high-
performing outlier exceptions from some wealthy households.
Beyond these examples, there could be serious differences with regard to the
positive, upbeat descriptions and interpretations Marriott places on the issues to do
with land and landlessness; with employment and migration; and with regard to
gender.
3.4 From Transformation to Stasis? Saith and Tankha 1970, 1987
It is time to take a look into the next period, the high tide of the Green Revolution:
1970–87. In doing so, it should be recalled that Aligarh was one of the nation-wide
districts selected for the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme (IADP),
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indeed the only one from Uttar Pradesh.16 So it had had the benefit of attention of
the promoters of the Green Revolution. It is also a district of the fertile doab region,
lying in the fork between the Ganga and Yamuna. It should also be noted that during
this period, credit and capital for agriculture were very heavily subsidised,
sometimes with near-zero or even negative real rates of interest. How did the village
fare? Did it live up to the sanguine of Marriott? Did it belie the more qualified
observations from Saith and Tankha? We will limit ourselves to just a few summary
statistics to capture the essentials of the overall outcome.
3.4.1 Green revolution in the village: running to stay still, or falling behind?
Over the 18-year period, the population of the village increased by 37 per cent; the
sex ratio ‘‘improved’’ from 823 to 894 though much of this could be attributed to the
emigration of village males; the dependency ratio rose slightly from 0.92 to 1.06,
and the household size from 5.98 to 6.06. The total land owned by village
households dropped by 17 per cent, while the number of households rose by 35.1
per cent; land owned per capita dropped by 37 per cent.
Mechanisation proceeded apace, with the number of tubewells increasing from
13 in 1970 to 31 in 1987, or to 46 if diesel borewells were included – a substantial
rise. The number of tractors rose from three to five. The cropping pattern shifted
further in favour of High Yielding Variety (HYV) wheat and sugarcane; and the
gross value of agricultural output per sown bigha rose by 74 per cent over the
period. Wheat yields rose annually by 3.00 per cent, sugarcane by 2.65 per cent, and
cotton by 2.97 per cent; milch animals were 1.02 heads per household and rose to
1.14.
The indices all seem in positive territory, but a closer scrutiny reveals some
uneasy facts.
The gross value of agricultural output per head, taken at constant 1970 prices
using the UP rural consumer price index as a deflator, actually dropped by 1.5 per
cent per year, suggesting that any slight per capita per year gains made were more
than washed away by deteriorating inter-sector terms of trade. However, even
without this effect, the trends point to a very marginal increase on a per capita basis.
Given that the richer farmers, with their tubewells and tractors, and with access to
easy and cheap credit, would display higher levels of input application, it would
suggest that a very significant percentage of landowning households would have
experienced a drop much greater than the average per annum fall of 1.5 per cent. Of
course, this only reflects the gross revenue from agriculture. But one would also
expect some diminishing returns to inputs, so that the rate of net increase could be
expected to be lower. This suggests that landowning households experienced
perceptible deterioration in their ability to maintain their incomes from their land,
the expectations of the Green Revolution notwithstanding; and this despite there
16 For a detailed statistical study of the impact of IADP practices on changes in yield and incomes for
different crops, see Brown (1971). Aligarh exhibits a performance for increases in wheat yields that is
much inferior to Ludhiana – the IADP district from Punjab – but one that is superior to all but two of the
other UP districts. The impact on increases in per acre income on account of the increase in wheat yields,
however, appears to be modest. (cf Tables A-23, A-26b).
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being a significant out-migration from the village during this period. Increasing
reliance would then have to be placed on non-agricultural sources of income. And
indeed, that is what the other data reveal, though here too the story is mixed, and the
bottom line somewhat discouraging.
Consider next the position of agricultural labour, which takes several forms, with
declines in some, such as permanent farm servants, and increases in others, such as
contract labour. The total number of days of contract and casual hired agricultural
labour increased by only 0.2 per cent per annum, and amount to a little over 100
days per year per household involved in hired agricultural labour. Significantly,
there were no threshers in 1970, but there were 17 in 1987.
‘‘It is reasonable to conclude that there has been a considerable push factor
operative on rural labour as far as agriculture is concerned. This has applied to
different extents and in different ways to virtually all categories of village
households’’ (Saith and Tankha 1992, p. 9).
Evidence (presented in Saith and Tankha 1992) on non-agricultural occupations
shows that there were three occupations which registered increases: services outside
the village; brick-kiln related employment; and band-playing, a niche village
occupation with idiosyncratic origins that has flourished in recent times. Virtually all
other occupations have been in some form of decline. The jajmani trades have
seriously atrophied both from the demand and supply sides of the equation; various
village based petty production have suffered, as have other local services under severe
competition from the external world whose entry to the village has been greatly
facilitated by the new link road to the road head township. This has also negatively
impacted the work of the dhobi and the kumhar. One could speak of a deindustri-
alisation of the village, or rather to the reduction of village production of goods and
services increasingly and exclusively to the category of non-tradeables. Twelve of the
16 complete households that have migrated out of the village since 1970 were in the
poor non-peasant category. The overall conclusion is one of atrophy:
‘‘over the 17-year period, the village displays a much increased degree of
incorporation with the wider regional economy. The village itself has become
much less important as an economic arena where the residents, especially the
land-scarce households seek or obtain their employment and earn their income
entitlements. To this extent, the self-provisioning capacity of the village,
which obviously was never complete, has weakened, and it has come to be
increasingly dependent on the linkages with the external economy’’ (Saith and
Tankha 1992, p. 14).
What is necessary also to note is that the outflow of resources is not just surplus
labour and declining traditional occupations and services, but also includes upper
end workers and capital from the richer households who prefer to develop lines of
livelihoods in towns and cities, as they experience diminishing interests and
prospects within the village.17 Overall, then, in 1987, the village seemed to be
17 This also points to the impossibility of conducting a complete enquiry by limiting oneself to the
boundaries of the village, or to those who are normally resident in it, and confronts the researcher with the
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haemorrhaging in terms of labour, capital and skills, though there were specific
groupings, such as the Bagheles, who were making good and strengthening their
economic, social and political base in the village, continuing from trends noted
earlier by Marriott.
3.4.2 Not so green?
While Marriott (1972) records the spread of modern tools and machines
unreservedly as positive developments towards rural modernisation, Saith and
Tankha (1972b, p. 722) express concern about the collective inefficiency of such
mechanisation, especially citing overinvestment in tubewells, which they attribute
to the ready availability of extremely low-priced credit to the richer farmers for
purchasing farm machines. Such capital subsidisation made it profitable for farmers
to install tubewells on plots much smaller than the technical command area of the
tubewell.
A related observation from 1970 concerns the nonchalantly wasteful use, rather
abuse, of water resources: the big bore tubewell with water running free, no
switching off, borewell baths as a status symbol. The heavy subsidisation of credit
and capital, virtually free water, alongside the fragmented nature of the structure of
holdings, induced much overinvestment in tubewells and ground water extraction.
Further, Saith and Tankha, in 1972, might have been one of the earliest to record
the ecological stresses generated by the new chemicalisation of cultivation, with the
HYV-NPK combinations of the Green Revolution. For Parhil, we discovered an
unusual form of share–tenancy involving poor peasants taking in land from large
landowners who were the more intensive users of the new technology.
‘‘It is normal practice for large owner of land to give out a small fraction of
their land for share-cropping on the condition that it be fertilised only by
farmyard manure, as it is widely believed that such a rest from chemical
fertilisers is necessary for the soil to recoup its fertility’’ (Saith and Tankha
1972b, p. 718).
Clearly, local cultivators had generated this indigenous knowledge, quite
accurately as was subsequently established by ‘‘modern science’’, after the lapse
of less than a decade. There is no way that such an insight could have been obtained
except directly through investigative fieldwork.
By 1987, though the size distribution of holdings had flattened out noticeably
under the pressure of subdivision, the number of tubewells had more than doubled,
from 13 to 31. Saith and Tankha (1992, p. 8, footnote 12) significantly note,
‘‘that from a social point of view, the new situation reflects a heavy
overinvestment irrigation, made possible by the under-pricing of capital, as
well as the level and specific methods of subsidisation of electricity prices for
Footnote 17 continued
challenge, not easily met, of tracking those that have ‘‘left’’ the village. It also emphasises the need to
analyse agrarian differentiation within a wider rubric that articulates these village processes with the
wider, external economy of the region.
Transforming peasantries in India and China 105
ISLE 123
agricultural uses. The water table has dropped in this region, and several wells
have dried up, or have had to be deepened; borings of new tubewells have to
go far deeper than before. The ‘improvement’ in irrigation volumes is
therefore not without cost, and this is borne by a much wider group than the
owner-cum-user beneficiaries of the ‘improvement’’’.
Therefore, there should be no surprise at the subsequent discovery of serious
stress on water resources and a falling water table in the region.18
3.4.3 Caste and conflict
We found the village to be a cantankerous, conflictual place, resonating far more
with Marriott’s original description of 1950–52 than with his later positive
discoveries in 1968. A 21x21 inter-caste commensality matrix that I did in 1987
confirmed this. The village had no elected political leader; this was perceived to
weaken its position vis-a`-vis the district government administration, e.g., in relation
to its pecking order or prioritisation in government funds, schemes and infrastruc-
ture. This opened the strategic space for the political aspirations of dynamic,
economically successful, ‘‘well-behaved’’ individuals, especially younger ones
without the heavy baggage of past cumulative inter-personal tensions. The rising
role of the ‘‘secular’’ state, i.e., district bureaucracy, as well as local-level political
formations form potential partners linking up for mutual advantage. The steady
assertion and rise of the Baghele caste group provide an illustration of this relatively
new phenomenon. However, the self-promotion of a few young Turks could not
overturn the frictions, factions and fractions in the social foundations of the village.
Village level ‘‘civil society’’ stood out as a vacant associational, organisational or
political space. All this inter-caste and group bickering notwithstanding, in
economic transactions, there was virtually no evidence of caste playing a role in
the selection of other transacting parties for most economic exchanges.
Marriott (1968) analyses the interactions of caste groups in Parhil in 1951–52,
taking ‘‘the case of the climbing Bagheles, former goatherds’’ (Marriott Slideshow,
1972, p. 80). Saith and Tankha also refer to the rising aspirations of the Baghele, but
also provide evidence of the violent conflicts that ensued from it.
‘‘Village frictions seem to have progressed from bickering over status and
esteem to violence over power and control. Elections to the gram panchayat
were held in 1988 in the village. However, following the campaign for the
election of representatives for the two places reserved for women, there were
violent clashes between Brahmins and Bagheles, and castes supporting their
18 A scientific report on the status of ground water resources in Aligarh District for 2008–09 confirms
that ‘‘ground water levels in the district have declined very fast and it is strongly recommended that
exploitation of ground water through private and shallow tubewells should be minimized… The declining
water levels have cause an adverse effect on the ecological balance as minor drainage ways which used to
have water are now almost dry. This obviously is the result of massive ground water exploitation for
irrigations as well as for industrial needs. Dugwells have become defunct due to lowering of water table’’
(Kumar n.d., 21) Between 1998 and 2007, an annual rise in the water table was observed in 2 of the 13
monitoring dugwells in the district, where the maximum rise was 0.38 m.; the other 11 wells experienced
a decline, where the maximum decline was 0.22 m. (Kumar n.d., 16).
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respective candidates. This resulted in the death of one person, bullet injuries
to several others and large-scale arrests including those of many prominent
persons of the village. This is symptomatic of the underlying tensions building
up between the dominant castes – whose position has been deteriorating in
relative terms – and the newly emerging ones such as the Bagheles who feel
the time might be ripe to express their economic strength in the political and
social sphere as well. It is worth mentioning that this tussle occurred prior to
the expectation of panchayats becoming recipients and controllers of
significant governmental financial resources’’ (Saith and Tankha 1997,
footnote 4, p. 81–82).
3.4.4 The occluded vision: gender
A careful ILO study of 1,621 rural households in Uttar Pradesh explores the extent
to which the reported low labour force participation rates for women could be due to
bad questionnaires, ambiguous or arbitrary labour force definitions, biases on
account of the gender of male proxy respondents, or biases arising from the gender
of the interviewer. The findings were telling:
‘‘Women were found to be extremely active in the sample area. Approxi-
mately 90% of the sample women were reported to be in the labour force
based on internationally accepted recommendations for defining labour force
activity, with over 10% engaged in wage employment and over 1/3 in
activities where monetary transactions took place. Typically, women
were engaged in several different types of labour force activities, implying
that it is not possible to understand or measure the extent of female labour
force activity in rural India without accounting for women’s multiple and
fragmented activity patterns.’’ (Anker et al. 1988).
Questionnaire type and design were the key culprit, though the gender of the
interviewer also played some part.
But there are serious hidden issues buried in shallow ground, and some quick
excavations confirm the concern. Consider the sex ratio, females per 1,000 males. It
stood at 823 in Parhil in 1970. There were 601 males to 505 females in the
population. Village girls marry outside the village while brides for the males come
in from other villages. Assuming all females and males of marriageable age do get
married thus, the net effect would be to increase the number of females in Parhil,
i.e., to push the sex ratio up. Generally, women live longer than men; and this effect
should push the sex ratio up as well. The overall low sex ratio, 823, then could be
largely attributed to sex differences in the village population in the younger years.
Seen thus, one could expect a child sex ratio, or the sex ratio at birth, to be well
under the overall number of 823 – clearly a worrying prospect, if this rough and
ready method is used.
There were clearly many serious gender issues to dig up and research, but these
were beyond our reach for a variety of reasons, not for want of interest. In Marriott
too, there are many references to the lives of women, in the form of observation of
rituals and practices. His positive take on some widening in the different forms of
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women’s visibility and expression goes rather to show how basically excluded
women were from social, economic and political equality.
3.5 The Jigsaw: How Does It All Add Up
Linking the chains and bottom lines of the various studies reviewed, the story line
that emerges is of a traditional village, moribund in technological and institutional
terms, that receives a stimulus from some of the initiatives of institutional reform
promulgated by the government, and from the new Green Revolution technology
package, but where the dynamic productivity impact eroded over the subsequent
period, where agriculture was unable to sustain any significant improvement in
incomes, leading to increased out-migration, particularly from the traditional
artisanal classes whose livelihood base could not stand up to the competition from
modern substitutes in the face of changing tastes and better communications. The
Indian tale up to 1987 is one of a step shift on account of the Green Revolution
package, not a sustained path of growth.
4 CHINESE COMMUNE, INDIAN VILLAGE – A DIALOGUE
This section seeks a resolution to the paradox presented at the outset: how is rural
China’s superior performance to be explained? For this purpose, the focus here will
be squarely on microcosmic comparisons of various institutional features,
contrasting processes and policies in equivalent domains in the Indian village and
the Chinese people’s commune.
4.1 China Through Indian Eyes: From Imagining to Researching
When I started out into researching India at the end of the 1960s, China was an
inspirational image for streams of young Indian radicals, but China was far away.
When in the village in 1970, there was nothing to compare or contrast it with, no
other reference point against which to relativise one’s comprehension of village
realities. But when, starting from 1979, I began to travel extensively in rural China,
comparisons and contrasts with India were inescapable, and there would be a
virtually continual parallel dialogue running in my mind as I delved into the novel
societal and political landscape of collectivist rural China: here was Maoism in
action on its home turf. Such silent conversations were a constant companion in
each of the dozen and more research visits that I made after that. In 1950, India and
China were credibly comparable in very many meaningful respects. But even by
1979, when I first set foot in rural China at the end of the Maoist era of high
collectivism, the credible comparison had already converted into an incredible
contrast. By the time Ajay Tankha and I returned to Parhil for our re-survey in 1987,
I had conducted half a dozen additional study trips into rural China that threw up a
continual barrage of contrasting images, veritably forcing the issue of the
potentialities and constraints to progressive transformations of turgid village
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realities.19 Over the years, I have tried to assemble and analyse my cumulative
experience of periodic field research on rural China in itself, but then also within a
comparative framework involving primarily India (Saith
2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012).20 It is often through the method of comparison that
one can comprehend, calibrate and dissect, and so discover additional insights into
one’s field of study.
The methodological challenges when researching rural China in the collectivist
period were very different from those encountered when studying the village in rural
India, though I will not take these up here in any detail.
The first issue worth mentioning is the mismatch between the meanings of
concepts as they are defined in the researcher’s mind, or questionnaire, and as heard
and understood by the villager from whom a response is sought. Problems arise from
multiple directions, as mentioned earlier. Many of these issues did not really apply to
the exercise of field research in rural communes for the reason that there was a
virtually uniform constitutional template that defined the levels, structures,
responsibilities, entitlements and claims, pattern of transactions and flows, that
covered all production, investment and distribution activities. At the end of the day,
all activities of each level of each commune were set in a common accounting
framework using the same definitions. Thus, communes could have widely diverse
structural features and levels of development, but these could still be readily tracked
through the accounting system of the commune. It was therefore necessary to quickly
master the intricacies of this template through detailed systematic interactions.21
It was usually possible for me to follow my own special interest in the design and
local operationalisation of China’s new population policies.22
The people’s commune was the lowest level of government and therefore had
various data gathering and reporting functions as part of its official tasks. These
were systematically collected and maintained – and almost always made available
19 Rather later, when writing (Saith 2008b) about some aspects of Joan Robinson’s lifelong engagement
with India, I discovered her saying: ‘‘when I was in China and Korea, I was thinking often of India’’
(Robinson 1964, p.1917). A similar sentiment pervades parts of the insightful report of the Indian
delegation that visited China (and Japan) to study the functioning and impact of agricultural cooperation
from an Indian perspective (Government of India, 1956).
20 See the references for an extensive listing of my research work on China: on population and gender Saith
(1981, 1984, 1995b); on rural reforms Saith (1987, 1995a, 1995c); on macro-economic dimensions of
poverty alleviation (2003a); on educational exclusion (2003b); on comparative employment programmes
(2012); on collectivisation and rural industrialisation (1980, 1986, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1995a,
1995c, 2001).
21 This essential capacity was built in the very first research study visit in 1979, and is reported in Griffin
and Saith (1981). I recall, on that visit, a timed ‘‘race’’ between a commune accountant using an abacus
and one of our team members using an electronic calculator, to process some data to calculate the value of
the workpoint in the unit. I cannot remember who won, or whether there was convergence in the outcome,
but it was a delightful exercise with learning laced with laughter.
22 The findings of these investigations are reported in Saith (1981) and Saith (1984). In this context, it
was striking that an Indian male could have access to women in various communes and households to
probe their perspectives and experience of this very new draconian policy; this access was sometimes, but
not always, mediated by the women’s leader of the team; there were few if any taboos to the range of
topics covered. It would be impossible to contemplate such an exercise in rural India, and least of all in
the Indian village studied.
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upon request. All initial orientation meetings at communes featured statistical
introductions by leaders and accountants, using well-thumbed dog-eared pocket
notebooks and folios containing all relevant statistical materials. This applied at the
level of the commune, brigade as well as the production team. Planning, direction,
accounting and accountability were all strongly data centric. ‘‘Seek truth from
facts’’ was a popular Maoist dictum, and we used it fully to request specific detailed
data on a wide range of topics. Numerical literacy was generally very much part of
peasant discourse, particularly in the more developed units. This well-structured and
managed system broke down after the reforms: data was thought to be unnecessary,
costly to collect, and in any case it was seldom used. Access for us depended on the
local leader, and I can recall situations where donations were obliquely, or
sometimes fairly overtly, requested in exchange for data, usually in county towns in
the 1990s.
Indeed, we sometimes encountered ‘‘models’’ visited by other delegations and
research groups, as for instance, Wu Gong Production Brigade in Hebei Province.
We did not object, so long as these were the exception and not the rule. It was
impossible to conceal the ‘‘model’’ status of the unit. In turn, we took that as a
special opportunity to analyse first-hand in detail the construction, functioning and
interpretation of the model, and its role in communicating to outsiders desirous key
features of the process of rural development. That was, in itself, valuable
knowledge.
As a rule, for any unit visited, we were able to calibrate its overall level by
scaling it against the distribution at higher levels. The per capita income of a
production team could be calibrated against the range for all the teams of the
brigade, and likewise of the brigade against the overall commune. We could then
know what part of the distribution we were dealing with. Selections of units to be
visited were made after consultation, to match our research requests, as far as
practicable.
Since our focus was strongly on the mechanics and internal functioning of the
people’s commune, and its articulation with higher levels, every visit, whether to a
rich or to a poor commune, yielded incremental information which added to our
understanding of how policy worked in diverse contexts and at different levels of
development. Through such itinerant research forays, it became possible to
construct a reliable identikit sketch of the core development, accumulation and
redistribution mechanisms embedded in the structure of the people’s commune;
such an abstract understanding could then frame research engagements in specific
communes and collective enterprises. Needless to say, the abstract template was
constantly under revision, and always remained a work in progress, as the field
regularly threw up novelties and surprises.
Detailed statistics – which had to be internally consistent – were the basis on
which income distribution was done within units; it would be impossible for a
commune’s statistical system to be collectively deceitful or fraudulent. Such
apprehensions could not therefore carry much credibility, though there could always
be flexible spaces in the matter of interpretation, and also with regard to other data
that could not be so verified.
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In general, there were few zones of silence or exclusion and few taboo subjects
that could not be addressed within an appropriate protocol. Unlike rural India, there
were no serious social exclusion issues to tackle within units, and though there were
few female leaders, apart from the mandatory women’s leader in the unit’s
leadership committee, women were not structurally invisible to outsider males as in
village India.
4.2 Microcosmic Institutional Comparisons
I will now focus on the salience of the institutional dimension23 and highlight its
role in accounting for the dramatic systemic changes observed in the countryside in
that period.
In China, the institutional framework has formed not a structural constraint, but a
policy amenable instrumental catalyst of the development strategy. Traditional
institutional configurations have been swept aside; new ones designed and
constructed in acutely compressed timeframes, and then again dumped for yet
other institutional templates deemed more appropriate for the national development
strategy. In its historic zigzag pattern, socialist China smashed the shackles of old
feudalism. Merely a generation later, many might see the historical irony of
socialism serving as the pioneer of capitalism in China, and wonder about the
headlong transition from socialism to its anti-thesis. How could the same country,
the same people, offer such massive contrasts within a generation? How would one
explain this structural and ideological reversal? It is arguable though that what
appears as a tectonic upheaval only constitutes a systemic realignment, another
phase in the perennial Chinese search for institutions and arrangements that generate
new potential sources of accumulation and growth, irrespective of the ideological
lexicon of the time. The continuity is provided by the underlying foundational
consensus and motivation to achieve sustained material prosperity, cultural esteem,
economic power and political ascendancy on a regional and global stage.
It is my contention that the rural institutional factor constitutes the heart of the
difference. Rural institutions constituted a fundamental constraint in the Indian case,
whereas in rural China, the institutional framework was repeatedly designed and
redesigned, partially or virtually in its entirety, as an instrumental policy variable to
serve the objectives of rural accumulation and egalitarian development. I will
support this strong hypothesis through a string of stylised binary comparisons
between the two countries. For India, the characterisations reflect the realities of the
studied village, more generally of agriculture in Uttar Pradesh and various other
23 The ‘‘institutional dimension‘‘ is understood here in its broadest interpretation covering personal,
commercial and public domains, embracing value, belief and faith systems, received and mediated norms
and notions underlying individual and group behaviour; lived culture, civil constitutional codes, penal
systems, lived culture and actually practised religion; the rules of the game and power structures
regulating access to and control over resources; all these as embedded in organisational forms and social
structures, relations and networks such as family, marriage, households, communities, occupational, class,
caste and ethnic constituencies, neighbourhoods and other collectivities, including notions of nation and
national belonging.
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parts of rural India. For China, the features described reflect the observed realities in
various rural Chinese communes studied on various visits.24
4.2.1 Land
India displays a typical, inequitable land ownership distribution with several
negative features. First, land is scarce; but not for everyone, since there is acute
inequality of ownership. In Parhil in 1970, the top 10 per cent of the households
owned about half the village land; at the other end, more than 50 per cent of the
households owned no land at all. Second, most of the land was held in small
holdings. Third, this problem was accentuated dramatically by the fragmentation of
holdings, whereby a household’s owned land was held in several plots of different
size or of different qualities, and in different locations in the village. Fourth, with
each passing generation, land holdings were being subdivided between the male
heirs, further disaggregating the ownership structure. Fifth, in the absence of
alternatives, land was also a symbolic marker of prestige, but it also ensured
survival, and served as a store of asset value. Sixth, there was virtually no market for
outright land sales in the village. Finally, some of the size aspects of the ownership
could be modified through tenancy arrangements, but only up to a point. So the
overall land structure was extremely exclusionary and also acted a structural
constraint to any technological change that incorporated significant scale
economies.
In contrast, all land was collectively owned by the households comprising a
production team which was the lowest accounting and organisational level in rural
China. At a stroke, this does away with the above disadvantages, even though the
overall scarcity of arable land was more acute in rural China than in rural India.25
4.2.2 Labour and employment
All children were expected to be at school till 16 years in age, though they would
help with field work in busy seasons. At 16, as a rule, they all became formal
members of the labour force of the production team. This meant that they were
entitled to share the jobs available, and would be assigned work against which they
would accumulate work points according to prescribed rates for different categories
of workers. The common value of a work point, at which all workers’ incomes were
calculated, was determined by the overall distributable agricultural net income
earned collectively by the team over the year. In this way, full access to employment
was guaranteed. Tasks were allocated to workers by the leadership of the production
team.
24 For a more detailed analysis of specific units in different provinces, see Saith (1980), Saith and Griffin
(1981) and Saith (1995a).
25 The potential of collective land arrangements for egalitarian modernisation was noted early by Joan
Robinson (1979, p. 135, cited in Saith 2008a, b, p. 736 n14): ‘‘Some kind of cooperative or collective
property in land and in means of production is necessary to provide a frame in which modernisation can
go on without polarisation between wealth and misery which it is bringing about all over the Third World
today’’.
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In the Indian village in 1970, education levels were abysmal and child labour was
commonplace. The average years of schooling for the population were 1.95, and
one-third that for females.
4.2.3 Local infrastructure development
In the Indian case, in sharp contrast, there were virtually no signs of local
infrastructural development, be it roads or electrification, a local health station or
school; this, in a village in the more developed, doaba region of the relatively more
developed region of Uttar Pradesh, in one of the districts where the IADP
programme was being piloted.
On the Chinese side, the situation in 1950 might well have been very similar, but
it had transformed by 1970, through the use of the Maoist device of ‘labour
accumulation’, whereby peasant labour that was unutilised in the off-season was
intensively used to generate local infrastructural assets, ranging from tree planting,
land levelling, rationalising and developing irrigation, lining of local water bodies to
convert to fish ponds, roads, school buildings, drainage, small bridge building or
whatever other projects were deemed locally appropriate by the commune and
higher level leadership. This happened in each commune, and the collective impact
was highly significant, including various multipliers on account of the forward and
backward linkages of these activities; in specific, there was a notable impact on
cropping intensity, on cropping patterns and on crop yields.
Elsewhere, I have made a comparative analysis of the operation and impact of
Maoist labour accumulation within the Chinese rural collective framework, and the
function of NREGA in rural India after 2005 under India’s neoliberal policy regime
and within the extant agrarian structural and institutional framework marked by a
high level of landlessness and the subdivision and fragmentation of land ownership.
The balance sheet comes out overwhelmingly in favour of the Chinese collective
where such interventions were highly productivist and had a very substantial impact
on rural growth, unlike India, where NREGA has lapsed into a default mode where
it functions really as a provider of some employment without worrying overly about
the productivity of such work and investment. The weaknesses arise primarily from
the dysfunctional contractual arrangements under which these schemes are
conducted. On the other hand, in the Chinese collective, there was an inbuilt
incentive for households to offer more labour on these schemes in order to increase
their income entitlements; indeed, if a household did not offer labour (though this
was not really normal), its income would be further reduced on account of the
devaluation of the value of the work point on account of the additional labour days
invested by other participating households.26 Further, such infrastructure develop-
ment depended in India on externally financed projects initiated from higher levels
of government which had their own budgetary constraints;27 in contrast, in rural
26 For a detailed analysis, see Saith (2012).
27 ‘‘It is technically possible, as the Chinese have shown, to make good use of the idle time of the
cultivators (once they have enough to eat all the year round) to improve irrigation, check erosion, build
roads and so on, but individual property in land is an impediment to such schemes because of the problem
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China, most of these schemes were self-financing, since the labour component,
which constituted the overwhelmingly large share of the cost, was only really paid
nominally during the construction phase of the scheme, and obtained its augmented
returns only after the investment came on line with its positive impact on
agricultural productivity.
4.2.4 Mechanisation and displacement
There are three comparisons of significance here. First, the fragmented structure of
landholdings was an obstacle to technological change across the board. Second, the
constraints of structure, combined with credit subsidisation for larger farmers, led to
substantial overinvestment in tubewells that was economically wasteful and
ecologically damaging. Third, all such mechanisation was labour displacing, and
this affected the livelihoods of the poorer sections of the village.
In contrast, the Chinese commune allowed for a more rational use of machines
with heavy economies of scale, and these could be much more economically utilised
under collectively planned cultivation, which also pre-empted inter-farmer conflicts
over water use. And labour displaced was reallocated other useful tasks, and thus the
displacement effect was nullified.
4.2.5 Migration
While migration of labour, and the flight of capital, are inherent to the agrarian
differentiation processes in rural India, and clearly in evidence in the study village,
the situation in collectivist China was sharply different. Rural labour had a rural
residential and work registration, the hukou. This prevented them from migrating to
the city to live or to work there; their entitlements were all linked to their hukou, and
so voluntary or spontaneous migration was entirely ruled out. As such, the Chinese
model was one of place development; it brought and generated development to
where peasants lived, viz., to the rural people’s commune. So communes had to find
solutions for all, including ‘‘surplus’’ labour, with no chance that the scale of the
problem would be reduced through voluntary rural–urban migration to the cities.
For the period under review, this remained the central policy in China.
4.2.6 Rural industrialisation
Perhaps the most powerful accumulation and transformative device embedded in the
structure of the people’s commune was rural industrialisation. Production teams
(PTs) owned only small repair workshops, or maintain a small building and
transportation team. Workers in these were from the team and earned work points
like team households working on the land. Production brigades (PBs) owned a
variety of small-scale industrial enterprises linked to internal or external demand.
Footnote 27 continued
of who is to get the benefit from them’’ (Robinson and Eatwell, 1973, p. 328, cited in Saith 2008, p. 739
n16).
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Here, workers were drawn from the constituent PTs of this PB, and generally
(during the reference period), received work points for a day’s work. These work
points were encashed back in their parent PTs. A similar arrangement applied to the
level of the people’s commune (PC), where the enterprises were more in number,
larger in scale and more modern. PBs and the PC usually had no agricultural
activities apart from specialised seed farms. The key accumulation device here was
the wage payment system: all peasant workers in the rural enterprises of the PBs and
the PC received their payment in work points, the value of which structurally linked
it with the average consumption level of the PT households. So workers effectively
received ‘wages’ equal to the average consumption of peasants – just as in the Lewis
model. Given that rural enterprises were usually very profitable, this automatically
implied that substantial enterprise surpluses built up at the level of the PB that
owned the enterprise. Over time, this made the rural industrial sector a powerful
dynamic engine of accumulation and development within the commune.
These surpluses potentially had hugely consequential development uses.
Approximately about 40 per cent of the surplus would be kept back for expanding
the industrial portfolio of the PB; another 40 per cent was generally reserved for
investment in various agricultural and infrastructural activities within the PTs of the
PB, focussing especially the less developed parts of the PB and its agricultural
operations. This, again had a significant impact on agricultural productivity and was
also inherently redistributive in favour of the poorer PTs of the brigade. Finally, the
remaining 20 per cent was transferred to the higher PC level for expanding the
industrial and related activities at that higher level of the people’s commune. Over
time, therefore, the rural industrial sector of the commune served as a transforma-
tive device through its massive potential for generating accumulation within the
rural sector. It also retained, indeed, strengthened the linkages between agriculture
and industry, redistributed income towards the poorer units, generated local
industrial skills, often fungible within the commune, and supported general
infrastructural development, including social services in education, health, sanita-
tion, transportation, etc. The twin engines of accumulation with the commune, viz.,
rural industrialisation and labour accumulation, laid the foundations of Chinese
rural transformation during the 1962–78 period and provided the platform for the
subsequent phase of rapid national economic growth. Indeed, in its first post reform
phase, it was the rural industrial sector that took the lead in the growth process,
consistently posting the highest growth rates.
This needs to be compared with the ubiquitous pattern of deindustrialisation that
occurs in Indian villages – the separation of agriculture from industry, the loss of
skills to the urban sector, the capture and draining away of profits by entrepreneurs
with private priorities for their utilisation elsewhere, and their very weak linkages
with village life. These effects were confirmed for the study village earlier.
Two other features of Chinese rural industrialisation of that period carry special
relevance. First, the process of the decay and deindustrialisation of rural crafts and
industries observed in Indian villages was pre-empted in the Chinese commune by
the policy of assembling all individual crafts, eg., weaving, pottery, or bamboo-
working, into common cooperative workshops; these collectives of artisans were
then rationalised and modernised in their production methods, product range and
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markets. If that meant a fewer number of artisans, there was collective peasant
agriculture or other industrial activities in which those so displaced could work and
claim their entitlements. The second concerns the ease with which farmland could
be transferred to industrial uses on account of the fact that both belonged to the
same set of shareholders, and that displaced peasants would retain their work
entitlements based on an equal membership in the team, brigade or commune.
4.2.7 Purity, dignity, taboos
In sharp contrast to the Indian scenario, there are few equivalent taboos with regard
to diet with nutrition taking precedence; none of the caste-based mumbo-jumbo
about ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘impure’’ with hygiene and equality taking precedence; no
qualms about manual labour.
4.2.8 Gender
Here, I limit myself to a single instructive comparison.
McKim Marriott, writing perhaps his very first paper on Kishan Garhi after his
first round of fieldwork, commented on patrilocal marriage customs, and referred to
dowry and subsequent flows of gifts to the girl’s new family as ‘‘bribes’’ to ensure
her safety and well-being. Further:
‘‘the economic effects of this patterning of marriage are great. Not only are
marriage expenses thus kept high, but quantities of goods follow marriage in
later years by the same non-rational path. One-third of all milk animals, are
given and an equally large proportion of cash is lent to marital relatives.
Perhaps one quarter of all debt is to fulfil marriage demands. The persistence
and vigour of such a structuring of marriage puts limits on the degree to which
a village can manage it economic affairs as a local unit’’ (Marriott 1952a,
p. 871).
Old China had traditional dowry customs28 rather like India’s, but these all nearly
disappeared with the Revolution. So there was no question of any rural household
getting into debt in order to service a girl’s dowry, or for the expenses of associated
with births and deaths. So whether parents have male or female child does not have
any significant differential pecuniary or resource implications. But there persists the
matter of old-age care, which remains ultimately the legal obligation of children.
Even in traditional China, there was a pragmatic flexibility to accommodate such
vital needs. Fei Hsiao Tung (1983, p. 54–55), in writing about his research village in
1936, records that
‘‘in case a family has no sons, an accepted solution is to bring an adopted son-
in-law into the family, usually from a very poor family or one with several
sons. Once this agreement has been made between the two families, the
28 See Fei (1939), read alongside Tawney (1932). Celarent (2013a) offers an insightful commentary on
Fei (1939).
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wedding ceremony will take place in the girl’s house and the husband will live
in his wife’s house with his wife’s parents.’’
This practice was retained in socialist China, and had particular salience in the
context of the limitations placed on the size of the family. So long as there were two
children allowed, there would generally be this possibility. But with the harder
imposition of the one-child rule, such a practice could not be taken recourse to. In
fact, the widespread problem was that a young married couple would be burdened
with the care of two sets of parents. This was one of the additional pressure points
that intensified the inherited behavioural feature of son preference. In the new era of
the rediscovery of tradition, some of the old burdensome lifecycle rituals and
practices have made a prominent return, though their pecuniary implications are
nowhere likely to be as disruptive as in India.
The shifting locations of women in Chinese national accumulation regimes, both
socialist and post-socialist, both in the public domain and in the family, about
control over their work and their bodies and life trajectories, provides a fertile
terrain for institutional exploration.29
4.2.9 Information flows and governance
Being the lowest level of government, where leadership was in the hands mostly of
the Communist Party, the commune was part of a vertical structure of continuous
flows from the central government, travelling through the provincial and county
levels. This facilitated a remarkably responsive command structure, where
instructions or guidelines from above were rapidly transmitted, reviewed, revised,
finalised and disseminated on a hugely up-scaled basis. This structure facilitated
political, organisational, developmental, technological and virtually all other aspects
of life, with progressively greater space for local customisation the further down one
travelled in this vertical structure. Direct horizontal linkages across units, however,
were very weak, with all exchanges being mediated by the next higher level of
responsibility. There was nothing remotely equivalent to this in the Indian case.
4.3 Chinese Masses, Indian Morasses
The key to the transformation of the Chinese peasantry in the period of high
collectivism was its propelling force, the agency of the mass mobilisation mode of
collective action. What explains its existence and power? I have elaborated on this
elsewhere (Saith 2008a); a summary statement has to suffice.
‘‘Several latent and active factors combined to form the preconditions for the
successful exploitation of the mass mobilisation mode of transformation. First,
the existence of cultural homogeneity on a near-national scale; second, a
powerful sense of ownership of the state by the masses and a strong sense of
identification with it; third, the mass appeal of many major rural policy
interventions made by the state, such as land reforms, rural industries and rural
29 I have covered some aspects of these in Saith (1981), Saith (1984) and Saith (1995b).
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socio-economic security polices; fourth, an efficient organisational framework
for enabling vertical two-way flows of information; fifth, a powerful, unified
command structure; sixth, the use of instruments for the ideological
motivation of the rural masses; finally, success itself was the lubricant for
sustaining the process – the benefits of economic achievements were widely
shared and there for most to experience, and this made the hard work seem
right and worthwhile’’ (Saith 2008a, p. 744).
In typical Mao-speak one heard across the countryside till the reforms, the key
lay in ‘releasing the enthusiasm of the masses’.
Perhaps nothing could be more distant than this from the realities of rural India,
then or now.
Before closing this microcosmic institutional comparison, it is essential to
register the demise of the powerful people’s commune. The second revolution set in
motion a grand reversal of earlier institutional strategies, both in town and county.
Virtually at a stroke, the communes were disbanded and the land ‘‘returned’’ to rural
households, thus reconstituting the Chinese peasantry, albeit at that point on an
extremely egalitarian basis. This heralded the immediate termination of the mass
mobilisation mode of transformation. With the commune structure as a power base,
the peasantry suffered a political decapitation, it became acephalous leading to the
total collective disempowerment of a new ocean of atomised peasants looking for
prosperity, and often for survival, as individual households within a dramatically re-
ordered, decollectivised institutional framework. And step by step, virtually by
stealth, the peasant households were delinked, detached, disenfranchised and
disinherited from the profitable rural industrial enterprises of which they had been
rightful collective owners. I have tracked this process over the decades and detailed
the micro-mechanics of this quiet, yet fundamental, transition in rural China. What
is remarkable is how systematically, and almost surreptitiously, it was achieved by
exploiting the seemingly chaotic outcomes emerging from the initial decollectivi-
sation. Peasants’ property rights and entitlements reverted effectively to the position
they had prior to collectivisation.
This grand reversal in the countryside again demonstrates most dramatically the
proposition that post-Revolution China has been able to address its institutional
configurations as policy instruments, to be redesigned and recast to match the
requirements of the accumulation regime in operation. This applied in both the
collectivist and the post-collectivisation periods; it applied to the way the peasantry,
workers and women, were conceptuatlised and incorporated into the development
process. The common underlying leitmotif that provided stability and continuity
was a powerful, shared sense of nation and nationalism.
Through this comparison of the contrasting microcosmic worlds of rural India
and China, I hope to have illustrated the explanatory significance of the institutional
dimension. Perhaps you realise you have been asleep when someone shakes you
awake; or understand how slow you have been moving when someone overtakes
you at speed. Through seeing others, we can see ourselves better. Comparisons help.
Through the comparison of the contrasting trajectories of Chinese and Indian
development, one can recognise the vital transformative role of instrumental
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institutional change in rural China, and the retarding ballast that the inegalitarian
and counter-productivist institutional configuration has formed in the Indian case.
5 IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
Radha Kamal Mukerjee had a utopian vision, inspired by Tagore and Gandhi, of an
intrinsically ‘‘Indian’’, value-driven path of development evolution that would
‘‘establish a solidarity between the villager and the city, the labourers and the
employers, the specialist and the layman, the brain worker and the manual
labourer … India will not allow the city to exploit the village, she will retain
the vitality of life and culture of the village. She will not suck out the blood of
one part of society to feed another part.., but she will feel the pulsations of life
deep and strong in her throbbing veins in every part of her social system’’
(Mukerjee 1916: 448–449; cited in Guha 2010: 54–55).
No one can miss the uncanny resonance with Mao’s declaration that, in contrast
to Soviet economics, Chinese socialism would dismantle the three great differences:
the division between town and county, between industry and agriculture, between
mental and manual work. But, equally, none can miss the contrast between the
powerlessness of this Indian utopianism and the massed political power driving the
Chinese socialist upsurge.
While recognising its awesome transformative power, it is also essential not to
glide over the dark side of the mass mobilisation mode of transformation. Its basis is
the glue that binds the individual atoms and molecules of a society into a totalising
unitary force driven by collective aspiration and ambition. But the polarity of this
transformative power can work both ways. A virtuous idea or programme is
diffused, universally up-scaled and implemented in startlingly quick time, but so,
inevitably, are its mistakes and errors. More sinister, however, is the possibility that
the political assertion of some culturally claimed and socially constructed oneness
becomes the vehicle for the oppression of various minorities that are deemed not to
conform to this unifying societal template. The overwhelming domination of the
Han community, and the relative numerical insignificance and peripheral geo-
graphical locations of other minority ethnicities, kept such outcomes out of the
frame; yet there are anxieties over the form and manner in which the renaissance of
Chinese nationalism, materialism and cultural affirmation will express itself in the
region and beyond.
The very ‘‘indigenous’’, very ‘‘Indian’’, very ‘‘value-driven’’ Hindutva national-
istic project of imposing some imagined cultural homogeneity on India’s intrinsic
diversity, often through the manipulation of majoritarian democracy, again provides a
sobering prospect. History provides an archive of ready examples of such mass
projects and processes gone wrong, and it is not unlikely that contemporary India
might add to that unfortunate list; awful can be just a quick slide away from awesome.
The last word must belong to the subject of this memorial lecture, and so in
ending I return to the wisdom, prescience and increasing relevance of Radha Kamal
Mukerjee in several of his many themes of research and reflection.
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In last year’s memorial lecture, T. S. Papola, the doyen of Indian labour
economics, provided a thoughtful and penetrating assessment of the 70-year old
pioneering book, The Indian Working Class, authored by Radha Kamal Mukerjee in
1945 and concluded: ‘‘his ideas, approaches and agenda are as contemporary and
relevant today as they were in 1940s… but, in a large number of areas, his agenda,
even though of great relevance even today, remains unfulfilled even after 70 years!’’
(Papola 2014, p. 21). He was champion of the rights of working people.
Today, I find it appropriate to conclude with a theme that embodies all the
essentials of his philosophy, method and message, viz., humanity and its
relationship with its habitat. Can nature cope with 2.5 billion voracious –
comprising both hungry and hedonistic – consumers growing at 7 per cent each
year? Any serious environmental or ecological audit of recent Indian and Chinese
development trajectories provide an incontrovertible negative answer. Can the ends
of the game be reoriented? And can that powerful institutional agency be deployed
to change direction? Or have the catapulting levels and forms of inequality
undermined those societal capacities?
In his Sir William Meyer Lectures, Mukerjee (1938, p. 296, cited in Guha 2010)
constructs a set of ten contrasting binaries, with the imperatives for progressive
social evolution and the practices of social regression arranged on opposing sides of
the ecological equation.
‘‘In it Mukerjee summarizes his view of the bad life and the good life. This is a
veritable green charter for India, relevant in every detail fully seven decades
after it was first drafted. It beautifully illustrates Mukerjee’s dicta that humans
have no option but to some extent imitate Nature’s extraordinarily slow
methods’’ (Guha 2010, pp. 58–59).
Gandhi was of a mind: ‘‘there is more to life than increasing its speed’’. But, as
Guha ruefully observes, ‘‘even now we await the change in values for which
Mukerjee hoped and strove’’. Mukerjee was appealing to a non-existing social
consciousness of an imagined social collectivity, an entity that remains as elusive
and distant now as it might have been at his time; if it was a dream then, it is a pipe
dream now. The time of our generation might be over, we live on time and resources
captured rather than borrowed from a voiceless, still-to-be born generation; carrying
on with ‘‘business as usual’’ will ensure it is also a stillborn generation.
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